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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The article examines whether the level of effective retirement age can be shifted 
upwards by increasing awareness of the consequences of premature retirement. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study uses multinomial logistic regression on the 
representative survey data for Polish working population. Special interest is given to the 
questionnaire with framing and anchoring effects included. 
Findings: The findings reveal strong retirement preferences of a minimum retirement age 
being the reference point and the natural anchor. However, these might change once framing 
is provided. Pension awareness is a significant predictor of postponing retirement. There 
can be distinguished a segment of working population with extremely low pension literacy. 
Practical Implications: Increasing effective retirement age is among most important factors 
reducing labour supply deficits and improving long-term sustainability of public finance. 
Special interest should be given to rational individuals with wrong assumptions on the 
mechanics of the pension scheme and individuals with extremely low pension knowledge in 
order to avoid severe old-age poverty. 
Originality/value: The study confirms that use of framing in increasing financial literacy 
leads to significant postponement of the labour market exit declared. Furthermore, there is a 
segment of the Polish working population with extremely low pension knowledge which 
should be educated. 
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Effective retirement age - the age at which an individual leaves the labour market 
permanently - is a parameter of high importance for public policy. Its low levels may 
reflect several unfavourable phenomena: low legal (statutory) retirement age, low 
propensity to economic activity (due to objective barriers, including poor health, 
insufficient skills, and care commitments, or subjective barriers, incl. low value of 
work), widespread eligibility to early retirement based on acquired rights (incl. 
occupational pension schemes), widespread availability of benefits economically 
equivalent to the old-age pension benefit (including pre-retirement benefits), tacit 
consent to pensioners’ work in the grey economy, low financial literacy of the 
pension scheme participants, existence of subsidized transfers (minimum pension 
benefit, extra payments), shifting the opportunity cost of paid work, low stability of 
pension system regulations, public policy for senior citizens.  
 
Typically these phenomena are interlocking. Low effective retirement age driven by 
all of the abovementioned factors can be found for instance in Poland (Buchholtz et 
al., 2021; Chłoń-Domińczak et al., 2020, Buchholtz, 2019; Chybalski, 2018), which 
shows that solving this problem may be a complex process. Its coexistence with late 
entry to the labour market and increasing life expectancy further raises its priority 
status. Relatively small output is created and distributed in the many years of old 
age. Given demographic ageing, this means either higher risk of poverty (for an 
actuarially balanced pension scheme) or subsidising myopic individuals (for an 
imbalanced one). In the latter case budget expenditures are crowded out by the cost 
of old-age pension benefits (either today or in the future through public debt). Both 
affect intergenerational solidarity negatively. 
 
This is the reason why public policy needs to focus on extending the period of 
economic activity and achieving a sound ratio between it and the length of the 
period when benefits are received through stability of the social contract on pension 
security, increasing the profitability of paid work, reducing barriers to economic 
activity and widespread education leading to rational decisions of the system 
participants. 
 
In this article we focus on the latter aspect. We aim at examining whether the 
declared retirement age can be shifted upwards by increasing awareness of the 
consequences of a premature exit with the use of framing and anchoring of pension 
information. This article contributes to the literature twofold. First, it confirms that 
extending the information pool leads to better decisions regarding labour market 
exit. Second, this improvement might be - at least partially - explained by 
behavioural economics. We proved that, if designed properly, the pension 
information may influence declared age of labour market exit even when a minimum 
retirement age remains a strong anchor. But to achieve so, the anchor have to be 
placed among the less and more favourable retirement options. 
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The article is structured as follows. Section 2 diagnoses the patterns of old-age 
economic activity and their long-term consequences. Section 3 summarises literature 
review referring to life-cycle savings, financial literacy and financial decisions of 
individuals and behavioural economics. Chapter 4 presents the Polish pension 
system. In Chapter 5 we describe methodology. Chapters 6 provides results of 
statistical and econometric analysis with necessary discussion. Chapter 7 concludes. 
 
2. Patterns of Economic Activity and Their Long-Term Consequences 
 
The duration of working time varies in EU countries. Economic activity of men is 
systematically longer than that of women. This can be attributed to the social norm 
of male breadwinner, career breaks, and (in some countries) earlier female 
retirement opportunities built into pension schemes. The lower bound in EU-28 is 
defined by countries with traditionally low female economic activity. 
 
Despite these differences, between 2000 and 2019 the EU has recorded significant 
progress in extending the period of economic activity among both sexes. Apparently, 
picking low-hanging fruits happens: bigger improvement is observed for women, 
and closing the gap between leaders and laggards occurs to a largest extent through 
shifting lower bounds. According to Eurostat data, after 20 years the EU’s poorest 
performer increased the average duration of working time of women by almost a 
decade (9.7 years, to 27.3 years) - in the meantime the leaders managed to extend 
activity by additional 4.7 years (to 41.0 years). For men, the improvement is more 
modest, albeit still visible: minimum duration increased by 4.2 years (to 34.5 years), 
maximum - by 2.9 years (to 43.3 years). In practice it means not only a significant 
improvement but also closing the gap between men and women, necessary to reduce 
the risk of old-age poverty gender gap.  
 
Poland recorded modest progress, comparing to the starting point, the pace of 
population ageing and European peers. In 2019 the average duration for females was 
30.7 years (improvement by 1.9 years in 20 years). For males the respective values 
were 36.3 and 3.0. It should be stated that due to phasing out benefits related to 
economic restructuring (economically equivalent to old-age pensions), until 2008-
2009 the average duration for both sexes was below the 2000 levels. As a 
consequence, Poland systematically lags behind even the laggards from EU-28. In 
2019 the distance to the poorest performer was 1.8 year for men (Croatia) and 3.4 
year for women (Italy).  
 
The opportunity cost of early labour market exit is high. Under Polish universal 
pension scheme early withdrawal means low benefit (the consequence of algorithm 
in which the amount of pension account is divided by remaining life expectancy). 
Low benefits can be supplemented with labour income, however, only in the early 
phase of old age. As individuals age, their needs increase (e.g. caregiving), while 
options of paid job shrink, leading to increasing risk of poverty and social exclusion 
in the last stage of life. In 2020 the replacement rate of old-age pension in Poland is 
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57.8% of average wage, and the ILO safety threshold of 40% will be reached in 10 
years. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Life-Cycle Savings 
 
Retirement is traditionally discussed in the context of Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) 
life-cycle theory. One of the conclusions drawn from it is the following: if the gap 
between the levels of income during economic activity and thereafter is significant, a 
rational individual should either save more earlier or extend the period of economic 
activity. These two strategies result in accumulating pension savings sufficient to 
smooth consumption once the individual retires.  
 
This theory has been criticised due to conservative assumptions. One of them refers 
to missed interactions between pension system and individual savings. First, 
contributions may be transformed into future savings based on population 
characteristics instead of individual ones. Second, private savings may be crowded 
out by social security transfers (Feldstein, 1974). Remaining savings may act as a 
buffer for those who fall below the pre-retirement income level, due to larger 
expenditure or crisis (Cavasso and Weber, 2013). The level of savings should affect 
the decision on the labour market exit (Disney, 1996).  
 
Another criticism refers to individual rationality in the decision-making process over 
the life cycle. Under this assumption, individuals have significant financial literacy 
and ability to estimate crucial variables: one’s own wealth, future consumption and 
life expectancy. If this assumption is broken (bounded rationality, Simon, 1972), 
individuals may underestimate pension wealth necessary to smooth their 
consumption or overestimate the dynamics of their pension wealth accumulation. 
Recent two decades of research provided robust evidence that future pensioners are 
far from rational.  
 
The period prior to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis was one of low pension 
literacy and light-heartedness. Knowledge of the demographic processes was not 
widespread while groundless optimism prevailed - especially among potentially 
more vulnerable groups (Guiso et al., 2013; Bissonnette and van Soest, 2010). 
 
From this perspective the crisis had a strong signalling effect. First, it showed that 
favourable conditions intertwin with recessions. Second, prospects of unsustainable 
public budgets due to the negative demographic dividend forced governments to 
reduce incentives to early labour market exit and encouraged individuals to prolong 
employment. In defined contribution pension systems this, however, requires 
financial literacy and decent levels of pension awareness. 
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3.2 Determinants of Good Life-Cycle Financial Decisions 
 
The number of financial decisions to be made in a lifetime is growing - lives are 
getting longer, more financial decisions are being borne by individuals and financial 
markets are becoming increasingly complex. Under such conditions the role of 
financial literacy is increasing. It allows individuals to act instead of passively 
observe (Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Choi et al., 2006, Ambuehl et al., 2015 on the 
difference between passive knowledge and literacy) and - especially - to act 
properly.  
 
From this perspective wealth at retirement is the outcome of at least three decades of 
pension decisions that are considered to be the most important stressors (Joo, 2008).  
 
Literature provides robust evidence that financial literacy is positively correlated 
with pension wealth (Ekerdt et al., 2001; Yuh and DeVaney, 1996) and makes 
financially savvy people capable of handling unexpected shocks (Hasler et al., 
2018). By contrast, financially illiterate individuals are characterised by lower 
probability of retirement planning, higher propensity for excessive consumption, 
lower saving rate, worse asset portfolio returns, and make more errors (Klapper et 
al., 2012). They usually borrow more, save less (Behrman et al., 2012; Stango and 
Zinman, 2009), and retire early more frequently (Allen et al., 2012).  
 
Many known patterns of financial literacy on the individual level were confirmed. 
Some studies prove that educated people make better financial decisions much more 
often than less educated ones (Hershey and Walsh 2000; Hilgert et al., 2003; Calvert 
et al., 2005). Men are more knowledgeable than women, even after controlling for 
age, education and income; prime-age individuals - more than youngest and oldest 
adults; more affluent individuals comparing to poorer ones (and the gap is larger for 
major advanced economies). Labour market activity is typically correlated with 
higher share of financially savvy citizens than being out of the workforce (Klapper 
and Lusardi, 2020; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).  
 
3.3 Improving the Quality of Life-Cycle Financial Decisions 
 
Acquiring financial literacy comes at a cost. Wrong decisions usually lead to 
suboptimal results. Reasons are numerous: lack of cognitive ability, insufficient 
power to tackle the problem, overconfidence, or not following rational economic 
decision-making (Tapia and Yermo, 2007). In fact, many studies proved the 
existence of bounded rationality (Simmon, 1972; Thaler, 1980; 2015; Zaleśkiewicz, 
2015) leading to suboptimal decisions. Bounded rationality is driven by self-control, 
imperfect knowledge and cognitive biases. Non-financial determinants were applied 
by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) to develop behavioral life-cycle (BLC) hypothesis. 
They expanded the classical life-cycle theory to make it more behaviorally realistic. 
Three psychological factors were included to the model: self-control, mental 
accounting and framing. 
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In old-age pension systems self-control problems are limited to a great extent by 
making the participation mandatory. Hovewer, one area left for individual decisions 
could be the moment of retirement when pension law indicates only a minimum 
retirement age. Knowledge deficits regarding the rules of pension system operation 
may result in exiting the labour force too early and receiving relatively low level of 
pension benefit, even if an individual is able and willing to work longer. Retirement 
decisions may be affected by cognitive biases - systematic errors in thinking, 
influencing judgement and decision making (Kahnemann, 2013), i.e., anchoring, 
adjustment and framing effect. 
 
Anchoring and adjustment relate to human tendencies to rely on the first piece of 
information received when making decisions (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974). 
Adjustments are based on a reference point that is usually insufficient, giving the 
initial anchor great influence on decisions and leading people to make errors 
reducing the rationality of their choices (Kahneman, 2013; Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009; Ariely, 2008). More knowledgeable people are less sensitive to anchors 
(Furnham and Boo, 2011; Mussweiler et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 1996), so are the 
individuals with higher cognitive abilities (Bergman et al., 2010). 
 
The statutory or minimum retirement age may be an anchor in retirement decisions. 
The amount of benefit that an individual expects to receive after retirement could 
also be one. We assume that the anchor in the form of minimum retirement age 
impacts individuals and their declared retirement decisions but these could be 
changed when framing is applied.  
 
Framing effect relates to ways of presenting information (Kahnemann and Tversky, 
1981). Generally, people tend to evaluate the decisions not in terms of their 
consequences for individual wealth or situation but rather in relative terms as losses 
and gains with reference to some given point. Natural loss aversion leads individuals 
to choose those options from those available, that allow them to avoid losses. 
Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1979) states that people are more averse 
to losses that they are attracted by gains. 
 
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) examined framing effects in retirement decisions 
using a social experiment in which they asked people about the declared retirement 
age with two optional answers but presented randomly in different order. So 
participants were manipulated with different retirement age with decision options 
presented as gains or losses from the first answer being the reference point. They 
proved huge influence of framing on late retirement choices but found no significant 
effect when framing for gains and losses of earlier than standard retirement. They 
also showed greater preference of one-time bonus over yearly increments. 
MacGowan et al. (2018) found that framing a pension benefit as a lump sum 
increases people’s expectations about annuity conversion rates and makes them less 
likely to opt for an annuity at present market rates. They also observed that framing 
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the old-age benefit as regular income rather than a lump sum had a greater effect on 
the willingness to choose the annuity than a ten-year increase in expected longevity. 
 
4. Polish Old-Age Pension System 
 
In 1999 a universal defined benefit (DB) pension system in Poland was replaced 
with a defined contribution (DC) one with a multi-pillar structure according to the 
World Bank concept (World Bank 1994). The first two pillars represent the 
universal and mandatory systems while the third pillar includes all forms of both 
occupational and individual supplementary pension plans. 
 
The first element is a PAYG system managed by Social Insurance Institution 
(Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS) and based on a nonfinancial defined 
contribution (NDC) formula. The second element was initially fully funded defined 
contribution (FDC) and consisted of open pensions funds (otwarte fundusze 
emerytalne, OFE) managed by pension societies (powszechne towarzystwa 
emerytalne, PTE). But the pension reform of 2014 made open pension funds 
voluntary and introduced NDC sub-accounts managed by ZUS as a default option 
for the second pillar. The funded element of the universal system survived but took 
the form of a partial and voluntary opt-out. The mandatory pension contribution 
amounts to 19.56% of a gross wage. Every pension contribution paid to the system 
increases the balance of an individual account of the insured in both first and second 
pillar. The first pillar account is indexed with wage bill growth and inflation while in 
the second pillar nominal GDP growth (sub-accounts managed by ZUS) or a rate of 
return (OFE) is applied.  
 
The old-age pension benefits from Polish universal public pension system depend on 
a balance of individual accounts in both NDC and FDC pillars. If an insured 
participated in the funded second pillar, its capital gathered in OFE is transferred to 
sub-accounts managed by ZUS prior to retirement. The pension benefit is calculated 
according to the following formula: the balance of pension entitlements in both 
individual accounts is divided by the average life expectancy at retirement. As the 
pension entitlements are old-age pension contributions indexed or capitalised for the 
whole accumulation period, the amount of benefit depends on the contributions paid, 
the rate at which they are accumulated, the length of contributing period and the 
retirement age. Individuals highly aware of these basic principles know that 
postponing retirement for one year results in ca. 8% increase of a public pension 
benefit. 
 
The minimum retirement age for women and men in Poland is currently 60 and 65 
respectively. It was planned to be increased gradually to 67 for both sexes starting 
from 2013 by increasing it by three months every year. The target minimum 
retirement age was to be achieved in 2020 for men and in 2040 for women. 
However, the government backtracked in 2017. Although the minimum retirement 
age was brought back to 60 and 65, the real retirement age is expected to increase 
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due to progressive internalization of DC pension system rules by individuals. There 
is no maximum retirement age so the insured could postpone the retirement as long 
as they wish and are able to do so. But to make a rational retirement decision they 
need to be provided with adequate pension information that allows them to 
understand the possible options.  
 
5. Research Methodology 
 
5.1 The Research Tool 
 
In this article we use a dataset from the survey Pension awareness of Poles 
(Czapiński and Góra, 2016) as a secondary data source. Its original purpose was to 
assess the knowledge regarding the mechanisms of the Polish universal pension 
scheme, awareness of the consequences of participation, and types of action 
undertaken by the individuals in order to maintain the necessary income level in old 
age.  
 
One of the areas covered by the questionnaire is the preferred retirement age. The 
question is asked twice: for the first time in a crude form, and for the second - using 
the anchor and framing effect (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1981) with the reference 
point (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974; Zaleśkiewicz, 2015) being a pension benefit 
amounting to PLN 1000 at the age of 67. In February 2016 when the survey was 
conducted, the minimum retirement age was on the way to rise and equalled to 61 
years and 1 month for women and 66 years and 1 month for men. So the respondents 
declared the age at which they would like to retire keeping in mind the target 
minimum retirement age of 67. Questions drawn for the questionnaire are given 
below. 
 
1. Bearing in mind that the amount of the old-age pension depends on the 
amount of funds accumulated during the period of economic activity, at 
what age would you like to retire? (options: age number, as long as possible, 
I don’t know).  
 
2. Delayed retirement allows for a significant increase in the amount of the old-
age pension from the general system. This is illustrated by the example of a 
person who, at the age of 67, would receive a pension of PLN 1,000. 
 
What would you decide having the same knowledge as in the example above? 
(options: I would retire at the lowest possible age no matter what; I would delay 
receiving the benefit: for a year, ... for two years, ... for three years, ... as long as 
possible, I don't know).  
 
The reference point, i.e., the theoretical pension benefit paid when retiring at the 
minimum retirement age (67), was placed in the centre of the table. The given 
choice of retirement age was framed as a potential loss or a potential gain of a 
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pension benefit for those who decide to retire before and after 67 respectively. We 
allowed people that declared to retire earlier than at 67 to face a loss of benefit 
amounting to ca. 8% per every year of earlier retirement. Symmetrically, for those 
who declared late retirement we show the gains they get in form of higher benefits. 
 
3. Do you think that delaying your retirement will increase the amount of the 
benefit? (options: yes, no, I don't know) 
 
Questions 1 and 2 allow to assess the impact of incremental knowledge on the 
individual decision on retirement age. The analytical strategy includes the 
description of preferred retirement age - unconditional and conditional on additional 
information - and finally, identifying determinants of preferred retirement age, 
including the behavioural effects.  
 
Table 1. Simulation of the monthly old-age retirement benefit amount depending on 
the age of retiring - the example given in the questionnaire 
age 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
benefit in PLN 654 711 774 843 918 1000 1090 1190 1300 
benefit in EUR 145 158 172 187 204 222 242 264 289 
Note: Amount in EUR originally not disclosed. Bolding of 1000 original. 
Source: Czapiński and Góra, 2016, authors’ translation. 
 
5.2 The Sample Population 
 
The data was gathered in telephone interviews conducted by a commissioned 
company. Initial survey sample covered 1006 individuals aged 18-67, virtually all 
economically active, the majority of whom participated in Polish universal pension 
scheme. Due to importance weighting the results are representative by gender, age, 
education and urbanisation for the Polish working population. However, in order to 
focus on the framing effect, we needed to remove the individuals covered by various 
occupational pension schemes from the sample. For such respondents conditions and 
incentives built into their schemes differ significantly (Walczak, 2019). We also 
removed six (old-age) pensioners. The final sample includes 910 observations. By 
reducing the sample we improved the results of the analysis with virtually no impact 
on representativeness. Largest differences (1.5-2.6 pp.) are the effect of removing 
farmers, whose separate pension scheme offers low contributions, early benefits of 
low value and correlated urbanisation structure. The sample characteristics are 
described in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Sample characteristics 
variable initial sample reduced sample 
difference 
(p.p.) 
 total 1,006 100.0% 910 100.0% 0.0 
gender female 551 54.8% 505 55.5% 0.7 
S. Buchholtz, J. Rutecka-Góra 
  
131  
Source: Own study. 
 
5.3 Data Analysis 
 
In order to answer the research question, we use multinomial logistic regression with 
the dependent variable of preferred retirement age. In multinomial logit four options 
are available: retiring below retirement age, retiring at this age, retiring above this 
age or don’t know. Independent variables cover demographic characteristics 
(gender, age), descriptors of interest in own future as a retiree, knowledge (link 
between delaying retirement and increase in benefit) as well as impact of framing 
and anchoring. Neither socio-economic variables, nor political opinions on 
sustainability of the pension system were statistically significant. The model 
combines dummy, continuous and categorical variables. The regression is 
supplemented with descriptive statistics. 
 
6. Findings and Discussion  
 
male 456 45.3% 405 44.5% -0.8 
age group 18-29 183 18.2% 169 18.6% 0.4 
30-44 343 34.1% 319 35.1% 1.0 
45-59 240 23.9% 215 23.6% -0.2 
60+ 240 23.9% 207 22.7% -1.1 
education primary 15 1.5% 11 1.2% -0.3 
vocational 231 23.0% 201 22.1% -0.9 
secondary 429 42.6% 390 42.9% 0.2 
tertiary 331 32.9% 308 33.8% 0.9 
urbanisation rural areas 379 37.7% 326 35.8% -1.8 
urban areas, 
population < 50,000 




133 13.2% 116 12.7% -0.5 
urban areas, 
population >200,000 




0-230  43 4.3% 32 3.5% -0.8 
231-460 285 28.3% 263 28.9% 0.6 
461-690 316 31.4% 290 31.9% 0.5 
691-920 64 6.4% 57 6.3% -0.1 




labour-code contract 831 82.6% 775 85.2% 2.6 
fixed-term civil-law 
contract 
84 8.3% 76 8.4% 0.0 
self-employment 26 2.6% 23 2.5% -0.1 
business owner 35 3.5% 34 3.7% 0.3 
farm owner 42 4.2% 14 1.5% -2.6 
pensioner 4 0.4% 0 0.0% -0.4 
old-age pensioner 2 0.2% 0 0.0% -0.2 
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Analysis of the preferred retirement age suggests that gender only partially explains 
individual preferences regarding the retirement age. With three possible options 
(specific age given, “as long as possible” and “don’t know”), men tend to choose 
working as long as possible instead of choosing a specific age. However, when a 
specific age is preferred, both genders are anchored to the existing levels of 
minimum retirement age - not lower (early retirement) and not higher than the 
already set thresholds. As retirement age should be binding for the majority of the 
labour force, these decisions reveal limited progress in raising awareness of the 
retirees-to-be. The share of individuals setting the age of retirement at least at 67 
(target minimum retirement age when the survey was conducted) is negligible.  
 
Keeping in mind significant gender differences with respect to length of working life 
and life expectancy, we applied gender perspective to identify whether awareness of 
the existing link between pension levels and postponing retirement exists. In fact, we 
observe several common patterns (Figure 1). First, lacking knowledge about these 
links leads to preferring fixed thresholds. Second, uncertainty whether such link 
exists, is most likely a signal of broader lack of knowledge. By distinguishing 
between genders, it becomes clear that female preferences of fixed age are 
systematically lower than among men. This is particularly important to emphasize 
that such bias creates a double penalty for women: due to lower pension wealth and 
higher life expectancy.  
 
Propensity to change one’s mind after rephrasing the question depends on the initial 
decision. Individuals choosing the fixed retirement age not higher than the threshold 
(minimum retirement age) typically stick to the lowest possible age (Table 3). Such 
attitude is significantly less frequent for those who initially selected working after 
reaching retirement age. For those who believe they will work as long as possible, in 
the majority of cases this decision remained unchanged even after introducing 
framing effects. Being unable to choose the preferred retirement age usually leads to 
being unable to reassess such decision. When it comes to changing one’s mind, 
introducing a numerical example usually leads to delay by more than one year. 
 
As shown in the Table 4, for females comparing to males, the relative risk for 
preferring retirement below the pension age compared to working as long as 
possible would be expected to decrease almost by half, while the relative risk for 
preferring to retire above the pension age by almost 3.4 times (henceforth: given the 
other variables in the model are held constant). It would seem that females are less 
likely than males to prefer retirement below the pension age, and more likely to 
prefer working as long as possible. With all caveats regarding the intentions hidden 
under working as long as possible, this result clearly shows that low female 
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Source: Own study. 
 
Table 3. Attitudes towards delaying retirement after framing and anchoring, 
















retire at the lowest 
possible age 
42.5% 45.2% 30.9% 8.7% 18.2% 
delay by 1 year 3.3% 3.2% 5.1% 3.7% 4.1% 
delay by 2 years 7.4% 10.4% 14.3% 9.9% 11.1% 
delay by 3 years 18.7% 14.7% 22.4% 13.3% 12.7% 
work as long as 
possible 
18.7% 17.1% 19.4% 57.5% 22.8% 
don’t know 9.4% 9.4% 7.9% 6.9% 31.1% 
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Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression - relative-risk ratios of preferred retirement 
age  
 
 retire below 
the pension 
age 






gender female 0.479*** 1.367 3.389*** 1.078 
age (cont.) 0.985 1.021* 0.996 1.000 
think about own 
future as a retiree 
no 1.693* 1.353 1.524 0.767 
counteract old-
age poverty 
no 0.893 1.386 0.823 1.590** 
propensity to save 
for old age 
no 0.510* 0.635 1.164 0.643* 
don’t know 0.562 0.642 0.812 2.052** 
delaying 
retirement leads 
to higher benefit 
(opinion) 
no 2.958*** 1.034 1.596 1.973*** 
don’t know 2.357 0.751 1.210 1.800** 
retirement 
reconsidered 
under framing & 
anchoring (work 
as long as possible 
- ref.) 
retire at the 
lowest 
possible age 




3.282*** 3.659*** 4.234*** 2.546*** 
don’t know 3.550** 5.215*** 3.247** 9.151*** 
constant  0.119*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.241*** 
Note: Base outcome - work as long as possible; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own study. 
 
Age is significant only for individuals interested in retiring precisely at the minimum 
retirement age (at p<0.1). In such case the relative risk ratio for an increase by one 
year for preferring retiring at the pension age related to working as long as possible 
is by 2.1% higher. It would seem that legal pension itself creates an anchor, which is 
observed especially among older persons. If the retirement age has a signalling 
effect (e.g. tenure sufficient to avoid poverty), participants with low literacy would 
also benefit from participation. Neither education, nor income were found to be 
statistically significant in explaining determinants of preferred retirement age. 
 
Thinking about own future as a retiree distinguishes individuals preferring to retire 
prematurely. For those who practice it, the relative risk for preferring premature 
retirement relatively to working as long as possible would be expected to increase by 
almost 70%. For non-savers (comparing to savers), the relative risk of early exit 
compared to working as long as possible would be expected to decrease by almost 
50%, and for individuals who have no preference, respective ratio decreases by 
almost 40%. By contrast, respondents not revealing retirement age are also 
significantly more often declaring unknown preference to saving. Such individuals 
seem to have no clear strategy, which increases the chance of random actions or 
picking low-hanging fruits, and consequently - risk of old-age poverty. 
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Believing that extending working life leads to higher old-age benefit is a statistically 
significant descriptor of preferred retirement age. For those who do not (compared to 
the ones that do), the relative risk of choosing premature exit is almost three times 
higher than for working as long as possible. For those who do not know, the 
respective ratio is almost two. This reveals an interesting regularity, if these 
respondents were right (no link between contributions and benefits was observed), 
their choice would be perfectly rational. Thus, by increasing the efficacy of 
educational actions, such segment of respondents may change their minds. In 
addition, again, choosing the ‘don’t know’ option seems to be a part of deeper 
ignorance. 
 
Finally, behavioural effects turned out to be significant at all typical levels, however 
high ratios should be interpreted with caution. With all relative ratios above one, it 
would seem that retiring at the latest possible moment was a modestly attractive 
offer. However, once the framing is made, there are still significant odds that 
working as long as possible will be operationalized into a specific timespan. The 
contribution of anchoring is puzzling, though. One possible interpretation is that 
displayed and bolded old-age pension benefit at 67 turns out to be insufficient 
comparing to the required tenure (two or seven years above 2016 pension age). Most 
likely, without the knowledge on life expectancy, individuals would expect benefit 
to rise by more than a few percent (and the concept of total value across the 
remaining lifetime). 
 
Reframing the options did make individuals change their decisions. Prospective 
losses in benefit quota make early retirement less attractive for 48.1% of pension 
system participants who declared lower than minimum retirement age. We showed 
the framing effect also for individuals that previously declared late retirement or 
working as long as possible. A vast majority of them (56.2% and 80.7% 
respectively) would like to postpone retirement for at least 2 years after getting the 
information on benefit increase ratios. Hence, our results confirm the prospect 
theory. The anchor of minimum retirement age seems to be strong enough to 
dominate over other cognitive biases. A second explanation is possible, though we 
asked about the declared retirement age before making people acquainted with 
losses and gains of early and late retirement. The other factor, namely choice-
supportive bias, could play a role.  
 
When people make a choice before framing they are less willing to change the 
option, especially when the declared one was a strong anchor. Finally, there might 
be an explanation of relevant trade-offs occurring at retirement. We make one 
combination of gain and loss (higher and lower pension benefits) compete against 
other (young retirement that allows to travel or have time for family and hobbies) as 
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) did when they framed people to choose between 
standard and early retirement. As a result they do not prove framing effect for people 
considering lower than standard retirement age.  
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Our results on the framing effect may be affected by the certainty effect that leads 
people to overweight certainty when making judgments. If a pension system is 
subject to frequent changes, people tend to retire as soon as possible. That is the case 




This article attempts to answer whether the declared retirement age can be shifted 
upwards by increasing awareness of the consequences of a premature exit with the 
use of framing and anchoring in pension information. We identified strong 
retirement age preferences among working Poles. However, this preference might be 
changed once the framing effect is provided. Furthermore, the delays are usually 
significant. The preferred retirement age is determined by gender and age, but 
factors related to literacy are more significant. There is a segment of people whose 
rationality is justified under wrong assumptions. However, it cannot be ruled out that 
frequent changes in the pension scheme encourage choosing modest but certain 
outcomes. From the public policy perspective special interest should be devoted to 
individuals who remain consequently undecided, which may suggest poor 
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